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China’s spectacular economic growth in the last
decade has been accompanied by its impressive
performance in the areas of space, missiles and
warship building. Among the more remarkable of
these has been its development of an Anti-Ship
Ballistic Missile (ASBM), which according to experts,
is intended to deter or target US aircraft carriers.
Western media and naval sources reacted with
concern bordering on alarm to the reports of the
development of the ASBM. There were also skeptics
who strongly doubted China’s capability to design
and engineer such a missile along with the
sophisticated technical infrastructure that its
operation requires. However in May 2010 when a
senior US Admiral declared that in his view the
Chinese ASBM had reached “Initial Operational
Capability”, it was clear that talk of such an
advanced weapon was not mere speculation.
This study was undertaken by a group at the
National Institute of Advanced Studies to make
an analytical assessment of China’s capability to
design and develop an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
directed against an Aircraft Carrier Strike Group
(CSG), and also the Chinese ability to create the
technical infrastructure required to transform this
missile into an operational weapon system.
In the last few years China has exerted itself to create
a satellite-based system to provide large area
Summary
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. It has
launched various space-based sensors to get
electronic, photographic and radar information
over large ocean areas of interest. All these capabilities
taken up in their entirety lead to the conclusion that
they could have been created to obtain early warning
of an approaching carrier strike formation.
While this system may not yet be complete, there is
enough indication that it has reached an advanced
stage. This may be the reason why the US has stated
that the ASBM has entered the Initial Operational
Phase. In addition to the space-based system there
is an Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar system that can
give real-time information on the location of an
approaching CSG. The study projects that the error
in the location of the carrier from all these space and
ground based assets for a missile to target an aircraft
carrier can be conservatively estimated to be 25 km.
Information available in the public domain on the
DF 21 missile has been analysed and an estimate
made of the overall weight of a reentry vehicle that
would be required if it were provided with
maneuvering ability, an autonomous on-board
radar, an onboard propulsion system with sufficient
fuel for reaching a mobile target as well as other
requirements such as aerodynamic surfaces for
terminal phase maneuvers. With these stipulated
capabilities, the reentry vehicle weight works out
to 1700 kg.
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For this increased warhead weight, the study has
calculated the additional fuel weight and the
increased dimensions of the first and second stages
of a hypothetical DF21 derivative. Measurements
and dimensional analysis of available images of
the DF21 D show a close match with the study’s
predicted dimensions, which lends credibility to
the claims made for the Chinese ASBM.
Overall, the study finds after careful analysis of its
space-based capabilities, its OTH radar systems, its
assessed C4ISR capabilities and the state of readiness
of the DF 21 D missile that it appears that China has
indeed achieved an asymmetrical equalizer to the US
carrier- based power projection capability.
It would be rash to assume that this single factor
gives China the regional supremacy it seeks. But
China’s ASBM has precipitated a fresh, critical
appreciation of power relativities, and shaken the
traditional view of the US Navy’s unassailable
superiority in the Pacific.
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CHINA’S ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE
GAME CHANGER IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN
Introduction
China’s determined thrust towards world power
status in the past decade and a half has evoked
both interest and apprehension. With the erasure
of its “century of humiliation” as a strong political
and emotional driver, China has made rapid
advances in all spheres of nation-building –
social, technological, economic and military.
While the progress in technology and military
strength has been keenly watched by specialist
China-watchers, its economic expansion has been
the most visible manifestation of China’s resolve
to assume its place in the upper rungs of the
international power structure.
China has a definite unfinished agenda. At the
top of the list is the reclamation of territories
that have (in the Chinese view) historically
belonged to it, including the reunification of
Taiwan with the mainland. In the attainment of
these objectives the Western powers led by the
USA are seen as major impediments. The US is
the main adversary, with global dominance and
military reach. More to the point, the US is the
dominant power in the Pacific, and a direct threat
to China’s ambitions.
The first step in China’s progress towards
balancing the power disparity was the attainment
of nuclear weapon status. China’s nuclear
strategy is not one of parity, but sufficiency. It
has sought to apply a similar strategy in its
neutralisation of the US domination of the
Pacific. US military dominance is based on its
power projection capability. The US Navy is the
main instrument of this capability, and the core
of its naval power are its carrier strike groups,
or CSGs. Evidently China has concluded that the
great equalizer would be a weapon that would
neutralise the aircraft carrier (specifically, its air
superiority) without committing its own inferior
naval or air forces.
Research and feasibility studies to develop a
ballistic missile specifically to target US Navy
(USN) carriers began in the late 1990’s and
continued for a few years before reports about
such studies were published in the open
literature in China. The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
(ASBM) was first officially mentioned in a US
DoD report of 2005.1 When the Office of Naval
Intelligence reported in 2009 that the Chinese
ASBM was probably nearing operational status,
there were many articles and papers by
1 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress;
Theatre Range Ballistic Missiles”, CRS Report for Congress; November 18, 2005 p 5 at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/57462.pdf “Although ballistic missiles in the past have traditionally been used to attack fixed targets on land,
observers believe China may now be developing TBMs equipped with maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs). Observers have
expressed strong concern about this potential development, because such missiles, in combination with a broad-area maritime
surveillance and targeting system, 14, would permit China to attack moving U.S. Navy ships at sea. The U.S. Navy has not
previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Due to their ability to
change course, MaRVs would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile re-entry vehicles.”
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professional and other experts in the US that
expressed alarm and called for positive counter-
measures.2 In May 2010 Admiral Willard, the C-
in-C US Pacific Command stated that “the ASBM
was probably very close to being operational.”
In December he confirmed his view that the
ASBM had attained “Initial Operational
Capability.”3
Focus of this Paper
The operationalisation of a ballistic missile
specifically targeting the central pillar of US
naval power in the Pacific would obviously result
in a major re-examination of regional stability
equations. If this system is as effective as some
observers fear, it would keep the US Seventh Fleet
away from Chinese shores and enable China to
act with impunity to achieve its long-term aim
of Taiwan’s reunification.
Chinese authorities have not made any claims
about the technological breakthrough that the
ASBM undoubtedly represents (or will represent
when operationally proven). But civilian
programmes on Chinese television, doctrinal
papers outlining the concept of operational
deployment of the ASBMs and other indicators
have for the past several years regularly implied
that China is on the threshold of a major
successful techno-military innovation.
This paper seeks to make an assessment of the
ASBM as a concept and the probability of it being
an existential threat and a tactical deterrent to
the US Navy’s CSGs. The paper consists of three
parts.
The first part is a technical overview of Chinese
C4ISR with detailed reference to the space-based
component of its capability to effectively
maintain surveillance over a large ocean expanse.
This part also contains a brief discussion of the
missile fire control problem, the basic launch
geometry, and the special features of targeting a
warship formation at sea.
The second part examines the maneuvering
requirements for a basic missile of the DF-21
type and assesses the modifications and
enhancements required to an existing missile for
it to meet the anti-ship mission profile. The
results are compared with the actual images and
data available on the DF 21D to establish
whether the DF 21 could have been modified
for the new role.
The third part discusses the impact that the ASBM
would have on the current geo-political scenario,
and on the military and strategic equation.
This is followed by a conclusions section which
puts together all the three parts to provide an
integrated perspective.
A set of technical overviews on the OTH radar,
the Re-entry Vehicle and an imaginary scenario
of the working of the ASBM against US targets
as seen by the Chinese are provided in the
Annexures.
2 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using The Land To Control The Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic
Missile”, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009, Vol. 62, No. 4
3 Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China Deploys World’s First Long-Range, Land-Based ‘Carrier Killer’: DF-21D Anti-Ship
Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC)“,China SignPost™ #14, 26 December 2010 at http://
www.andrewerickson.com/2010/12/china-deploys-world%E2%80%99s-first-long-range-land-based-%E2%80%98carrier-
killer%E2%80%99-df-21d-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm-reaches-%E2%80%9Cinitial-operational-capability%E2%80%9D-ioc/
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PART I - TECHNICAL ASPECTS
1. Operational and Tactical
Considerations
1.1 Direction of Threat and Surveillance
Area
The maritime threat to China may emanate from
a wide arc ranging from the north-east to the
south. Geographical factors and other practical
considerations such as the presence of
commercial marine traffic and the limited sea
room available in the southern sector may
perhaps modify the likely threat arc to the north-
east to south-east sector. In this sector the main
US Naval bases are Yokosuka in Tokyo Bay and
Yigo in Guam. Whereas Japan is close enough
for a strike with very little notice, the Guam base
is over 2500 kms distant. Considering that the
mission radius of the F-18 Super Hornet (the US
Navy’s main carrier-borne attack aircraft) is
about 750 Kms, China’s aim would be to prevent
a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) approaching to less
than about 1000 kms off the coast. To be able to
attack an approaching CSG at that distance,
surveillance would probably be mounted 1000
to 1500 kms to seawards beyond the 1000 km
limit mentioned; the area inside 1000 kms being
left to shore-based tactical surveillance forces.
(See Fig. 1)
1.2 Features of A CSG Formation
A typical CSG is a large combatant formation with
one or two aircraft carriers, anti-submarine, air
defence and missile defence destroyers and
cruisers, as well as logistic ships. Together they
may number from ten to fifteen units. Each
carrier would have a complement of about 75
combat and reconnaissance aircraft, forming the
main strike power of the force. In addition to
Figure 1: Surveillance ARCS to Detect CSG
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their defensive capabilities the warships are also
heavily armed with guns and anti-ship and land-
attack missiles. In the scenario of a ballistic
missile threat there would also be BMD-capable
destroyers and cruisers in the escort equipped
with the Aegis system. The main part of the
formation, without counting the advanced and
distant support units, could be spread over an
area of twenty kms radius, or over a thousand
square kms. Even in peacetime, all warship
formations are on combat alert, though at a lower
level of readiness. At the slightest tension or
warning, the level of preparedness is raised. This
would mean that at all times there would be
aircraft airborne from the carrier, on practice
sorties or on continuous early warning and
combat patrol tasks. Thus an operational CSG
would be operating aircrafts round the clock.
The units of the formation would not all be
following the same course and speed, but they
would all hold to the same base course and
speed. Thus there would be no significant relative
motion differences, except in rare circumstances.
All ships of the formation would be capable of
high speeds and manouvres when alerted, such
as in case of a missile warning.
The oceans today are busy waterways and are used
by scores of transiting tankers and commercial
ships at any given time. Many of these may be of
a few hundred thousand tons displacement,
compared to most US carriers which are in the
high ninety thousand ton bracket. The flat deck
of a tanker could look similar to that of an aircraft
carrier. A sketch of a typical CSG formation is at
Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Typical us Carrier Strike Group Formation
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These characteristics create problems of
identification and target discrimination for
surveillance and tracking radars, and of electronic
countermeasures, terminal guidance and anti-
missile defence penetration for an incoming
ASBM.
2. Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
2.1 Background
Only technical means of gathering intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance missions are
considered in this assessment. While there are
differences in these tasks, they all deal with
information about the position and movement
of the target and can thus be lumped together
conveniently for purposes of this discussion.
Timely target detection is crucial for the success
of the ASBM system. This can be achieved
through air, sea-based (including underwater)
platforms, ground and space-based radar as well
as other sensor systems. Together with the
corresponding platforms, these form the essence
of the C4ISR system.
2.2 Airborne and Sea-based Sensors
Airborne and Sea-based sensors (both surface
and underwater) mounted on military aircraft,
naval ships and submarines can be useful in
maintaining surveillance and carrying out
reconnaissance in specific areas for varying
periods. China does have the means to deploy
aircraft and ships with the necessary technical
means to perform these tasks. At present there
is a dearth of nuclear submarines in the PLA (N)
to carry out dedicated reconnaissance missions,
but judging by the ongoing submarine
construction programmes, it may be expected
that with time these shortages will be made up
to enable the PLA (Navy) to allocate SSNs for
this task.
Aircraft and naval assets are however best used
when the likelihood of the target’s passage
through a particular area in a finite period of time
are known or can be reasonably estimated. They
cannot be effectively used to maintain round-
the-year surveillance over vast swaths of the
ocean, which is what the ASBM system requires.
These units can be used more economically and
efficiently in nearer regions, perhaps within a
1000-km range of the coast.
2.3 Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Radars
China has been working on Over-the-Horizon
(OTH) radars since the late 1960s, but significant
progress has really taken place in the last decade.
Initially developed as part of the Anti-missile
defence measures, OTH radars are now widely
used for surface surveillance as well. China’s
development of OTH radar has been widely
reported in both the international as well as the
Chinese media and includes two types of radars:
♦ sky wave radars which depend on
backscatter from the ionosphere and are
commonly referred to as OTH-B radars;
♦ the ground or surface wave type radars
(OTH-SW) which have a much shorter range.
As reported in the Hong Kong media the China
National Electronics Import and Export
Corporation released details of an OTH-B radar
installation in 2007. Performance details of the
radar are not available from authenticated
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sources, but conservative estimates place the
minimum detection range at about 800 kms,
and the maximum detection range at about
3000 kms.
China is reported to have at least one Over-the-
Horizon (OTH-B) sky-wave radar system
operational4, which could be used in the early
warning role against an approaching CSG. A map
showing likely areas that can be kept under
surveillance for the OTH-B radar is at Fig. 3.5
China’s current surveillance assets include a
number of both coastal OTH-SW and inland-
based OTH-B radar systems. In the context of
this paper only OTH-B radars are considered as
the area of our interest is beyond 1000 kms.
These give detection and tracking capability
against surface ships as well as aircraft.
The OTH radar has two parts – a transmitter part
and a receiver part. These are normally separated
from each other by distances of 100 to 200 km.
Each part consists of a long linear line of
individual elements spread out over a distance
of 2 to 3 km. The OTH radars operate at
frequencies of between 5 to 30 MHz. The
locations of these radars are well known. An
evaluation of the performance of these radars
by radar experts is available in Annexure 1.
Figure 3: Surveillance ARC for OTH (B) Radar
4 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile - Developments and Missing Links”; Naval War College
Review, Autumn 2009, Vol. 62, No. 4 http://www.chinasecurity.us/pdfs/others/Hagt&Durnin.pdf “Detecting the carrier at
great distances would depend on early-warning systems, such as sky-wave, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, or electronic signals
intelligence, that would give a general idea of the target’s geographic coordinates.49 “There is substantial evidence that China
has at least one over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) system up and running.50 It could be used to identify targets at long
range, although with a tracking error of from twenty to forty kilometres...”
5 Sean O’Connor,“OTH(B) Radar Viewing Area”; IMINT & Analysis; Nov 11 2008, http://geimint.blogspot.com/
2008_11_01_archive.html
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One such OTH B radar is located close to
Shenchang. The transmitter and receiver of this
OTH B radar are separated by about 100 km. The
transmitter is located at 27047’ latitude and
120046’ longitude. The receiver is located at
about 270 45’ latitude 1200 45’ longitude. Its
location along the south eastern coast of China
close to Taiwan also provides China with the
coverage that controls access routes to Taiwan
from the North East and South East Pacific very
similar to the coverage shown in Figure 3. It
covers most if not all the areas from where
threats can emanate.
While OTH-B radars have huge range advantages,
they have their own limitations. The chief
limitation is their poor spatial resolution. The
resolution achievable depends on the Doppler
separation of the scatter signals. This depends
not only on the relative movement of objects of
interest but also has a contribution from the
ionosphere. As mentioned earlier, the relative
motion between the ships in a CSG is not
significant. However there would be aircraft
sorties every two hours or so, which would be
detectable. The OTH resolution along the
direction of range would be better than their
resolution across the range.
An additional difficulty with OTH radars is they
are prone to disturbances from ionospheric
conditions. They would therefore require
frequent calibration from independent data
collected on the ionosphere. This may require
an additional dedicated facility.
Based on our evaluation of the performance of
OTH radars along with recent developments
in various signal processing techniques,  the
spatial resolution achievable by an OTH radar
system has been  conservatively assessed to
be about 20 km. This means that the CSG
location could be anywhere within a  20 km
radius based on the tracking data supplied by
the OTH. Obviously this accuracy is insufficient
for guiding a missile to the target. The location
of the CSG using the OTH is only possible once
it comes within 2000 to 3000 km of the OTH.
Even then it may be difficult to pick up the
CSG from the other objects like commercial
shipping  that will be present in the broad
expanse of the ocean.
These two issues make it necessary to have other
independent means of supplementing the target
data. To strike the CSG either the target has to
be located after the launch of the missile by a
sensor on-board the missile or the target must
be located very precisely just before the launch
of the missile.  Air and sea-based platforms may
be in a position to provide  such independent
inputs.  However, continuous monitoring by air
and sea based platforms at such distances from
the shore pose major constraints in respect  of
logistics, operations and expenditure and are not
practical. Consequently, reconnaissance and
electronic intelligence satellites are the only
means of obtaining independent and precise CSG
location inputs.
3. The Space Component of the ASBM
System
Together with OTH radars, the space component
of the system is one of the vital requirements for
the viability of China’s ASBM capability. Three
elements of the space-based system would be of
critical importance. These are:
♦ Reconnaissance Satellites equipped with
Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR).
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♦ Reconnaissance satellites providing high
resolution optical imagery.
♦ Large Area Electronic Ocean Surveillance
Satellites to locate and track targets of
interest in the Ocean.
3.1 Reconnaissance Satellites with Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR)
Reconnaissance satellites equipped with
Synthetic Aperture Radar will provide all-weather
as well as day and night information on targets
of interest. To cover the globe on a continuous
basis a large number of such satellites would be
needed. A smaller number (two to three) may
be adequate to cover a more limited theatre like
the Pacific Ocean approach to China. These
satellites must be able to cover a fairly large area
and may need to scan areas of interest on either
side of the satellite track. They would provide
confirmation of any preliminary identification of
a potential threat. They may need to work in
two different modes – a coarser resolution broad
swath mode to cover a larger area and a more
limited swath with higher resolution to clearly
identify a target of interest. Many commercial
civilian satellites have demonstrated these
capabilities. SAR has very high data transmission
rates. It also consumes a lot of processing power
to convert the data into products that can be
used for identification and confirmation. These
require associated ground and some space
infrastructure which could become vulnerable
points in the overall architecture of the system.
For global coverage many satellites equipped
with SAR follow near polar or sun- synchronous
orbits. Space-based SAR systems are more
difficult to build and operate than optical
imaging payloads. Satellites are likely to be
heavier and also may need higher on-board
power.
3.2 Reconnaissance Satellites Carrying High
Resolution Optical Payloads
The SAR constellation may require support from
more conventional optical and infra-red sensors
on satellites. Such satellites are also generally
in sun-synchronous orbit and carry Charged
Couple Device-based digital camera systems.
Data rates especially for metre and sub-metre
resolution are likely to be high, but processing
of the data and speedy delivery capabilities have
already been demonstrated in many national and
commercial systems. Building such a sensor that
can also be moved around on either side of the
satellite track, may not be too difficult for a
mature space power like China. The ground
infrastructure is easier to build and operate as
compared to the SAR system. The optical sensor
on the satellite is a complement to the SAR, as
by itself it may not provide continuous coverage
because of both cloud cover and night time
coverage requirements. Therefore without the
SAR component the system may not be as
credible.
3.3 Orbit, Resolution & Coverage
Considerations for SAR and Optical
Sensors
The tradeoff between resolution and swath
covered on the ground will determine the orbit
of both the SAR and the optical sensor satellites.
Orbits generally are fairly low earth orbits
ranging from about 500 to 900 km. Sun-
synchronous orbits with inclinations between 97
and 98 degrees are obvious choices as they
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provide the additional benefit of global coverage
and data for many civilian applications as
well.
Currently for typical sun-synchronous orbits the
maximum swath widths for both SAR and optical
payloads would be about 100 km. This means
that there would be large gaps in the ground
coverage between satellite passes that could even
last a few hours. There could be gaps of several
days before the satellites come back to survey a
given area of the sea. Increasing the number of
satellites and spacing them out could provide
continuous coverage. However this increases both
the cost and the complexity of operations. For
continuous or near-continuous surveillance of
areas of interest a large area ocean surveillance
capability is a necessity for the ASBM to pose a
serious threat to a CSG.
3.4 Large Area Ocean Electronic Surveillance
Satellites for Location and Tracking
The third and most important space-based
component of the ASBM system is a satellite
system that can provide large area coverage of
the oceans on a continuous or near-continuous
mode. Such satellites monitor electronic
communications and other radio-emissions from
ships to locate them in the open sea. They collect
data from a fairly large area through a number
of broad-band onboard receivers. To locate the
ship the same emission has to be collected from
at least three different satellites. If the positions
of the satellites and the time at which the signal
is detected by the different satellites are known
then the location of the source of emission can
be fixed. Higher altitude orbits would cover
larger areas. A typical system involves three
satellites separated by known distances in a 63.5
degree inclination orbit. The reason this orbit is
chosen is because at this inclination there is no
precession of the apogee or perigee of the
satellite. The relative distances between satellites
as well as their relative altitudes remain
unaltered making it easier to determine the
position of the emitter.
Some information on the configuration of
satellites launched by the US to collect electronic
intelligence on ships that were located over the
horizon may be worth looking at to understand
Chinese capabilities and intentions. Following a
series of experiments in the early 1970’s the US
deployed an operational ocean surveillance system
starting from 1976. This has since been replaced
by a more advanced system starting in 1990.
The ocean electronic surveillance system
deployed by the US consists of three co-orbiting
satellites each of which is equipped with wide-
band receivers operating in different frequencies
that can detect electronic emissions from ships.
The US satellites were in 1100 km circular orbits
inclined at 63.5 degrees. The three satellites are
separated from each other by known distances,
typically 50 to 240 km. The same signal is
received by the three different receivers at
different times. This enables the determination
of position accurately if the separation between
the satellites is known and the time signals on
all three satellites are synchronised. Successive
determination of positions may also enable the
velocity of the target to be determined. The
received data is transmitted to ground stations
for further processing from where it is sent to a
command and control facility. From here it is
disseminated to the user.6
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Four clusters of three satellites in different orbital
planes separated by 60 to 90 degrees provided
the US with global as well as real time coverage
of all areas. Each cluster would typically cover a
zone of 3500 km radius. Even with a single
cluster, a second fix on an object of interest
would most probably be available in the next
orbit – typically about 107 to 108 minutes later.
The large coverage also makes revisit periods
quite short. If the area of interest is limited to
the western Pacific a single cluster of co-orbiting
satellites at 63.5 degrees inclination may provide
the required surveillance capability to detect and
track a CSG well before it comes within the range
of the OTH radar.
The geometric arrangement between the
satellites is crucial for accurate prediction of
location and velocity. To take care of the risk of
this geometry breaking down over the poles, one
of the satellites in the cluster may have a slightly
different apogee. The advantage of the 63.5
degree orbit is that this apogee will remain fixed
and not change with time. Thus the relative
positions of the satellites and the distances
between them may not change from orbit to
orbit. A 63.5 degree orbit and three co-orbiting
satellites separated by a small distance is a typical
signature of such a system.
These three space components would be key
elements in the proposed Chinese OTH-based
ASBM system. Other space-based assets such as
communications satellites, navigation satellites
and data relay satellites would complement these
capabilities. With the exception of a Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite the Chinese have all these
capabilities. These other elements are assumed
to exist and not specifically addressed in this
paper.
3.5 China’s Space Based Ocean
Reconnaissance & Surveillance
Capabilities for an ASBM Mission
Table 1 provides data on the more recent
launches by China along with their orbit details.
This has been prepared from information
available in open sources.7
From the various parameters listed in the above
Table we can clearly see that Yaogan 1, Yaogan 3
and Yaogan 10 seem to have similar
characteristics. Public reports available including
information provided by China suggest that this
is a satellite carrying a Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR).
By the same token it appears from Table 1 that
Yaogan 2, Yaogan 4 and Yaogan 7 are similar. As
per Chinese sources these appear to be the
optical reconnaissance component of the ASBM
system.
The launch of the Yaogan 9A, 9B and 9C satellites
on the 5th of March 2010 on a specially designed
Long March launcher is the first deployment of
China’s Large Area Ocean Electronic Surveillance
6 For a description of the US Ocean Surveillance ELINT system please see Major A. Andronov, “The US Navy’s White Cloud Space-
borne ELINT System”, Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Foreign Military Review), No.7, 1993, pp. 57-60. http://
www.fas.org/spp/military/program/surveill/noss_andronov.htm
7 http://www.astronautix.com/craft/yaogan.htm. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaogan and http://www.sinodefence.com/space/
spacecraft/yaogan.asp
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system. The orbital parameters such as altitude,
orbital inclination and orbital period are very
similar (1100 km altitude, 63.5 degree
inclination, 107 minutes) to the first generation
US deployment of a Large Area Ocean Electronic
Surveillance System. The radius of coverage of
such a system would be about 3500 km – which
will provide notice of an approaching CSG well
before the threshold of 2000 km for the ASBM is
crossed. Even a single constellation will be able
to monitor the CSG and provide advance notice
to China. In tandem with SAR and optical
reconnaissance satellites the ability to detect and
track the CSG well before the 2000 km limit is
reached can now be termed real.
This deployment of the three-satellite Ocean
ELINT capability marks the transition from
potential capability to operational capability. The
Chinese may or may not deploy more clusters
spaced appropriately so as to provide continuous
coverage around the world. Even without it,
detection and identification of a Carrier Strike
Group is possible well outside the presumed
2000 km Chinese threshold. The deployment and
operation of this constellation may well be the
real reason for the US to term the ASBM as
having reached “Initial Operating Capability”.
Table 1: Ocean Reconnaissance – Recent Chinese Satellites
Satellite Date Launch Launch Orbit Apogee Period Comments
Time GMT site  inclination Perigee km (minutes)
degree
Yaogan1 26/4/2006 22.48 Taiyuan 97.8 630 x 627 km 97.3 minutes. SAR
Yaogan2 25/5/2006 07.12 Jiuquan 97.8 655 x 631 km 97.6 minutes Optical;
Yaogan3 11/11/2007 22.48 Taiyuan 97.8 629 x 628 km 97.3 minutes Same as
1 SAR
Yaogan4 1/12/2008 04.42 Jiaquan 97.9 654 x 632 km 97.6 minutes Same as 3
Optical
Yaogan5 15/12/2008 03.22 Taiyuan 97.4 496 x 486 km 94.4 minutes Higher
resolution -
Optical
Yaogan6 22/4/2009 02.55 Taiyuan 97.6 512 x 512 km 94.9 minutes Higher
resolution -
Optical
Yaogan7 9/12/2009 08.42 Jiaquan 97.8 659 x 623 km 97.5 minutes Same as
1, 3 - Optical
Yaogan8 15/12/2009 02.31 Taiyuan 100.5 1204 x 109.4 Optical large
1193km minutes area
coverage?
Yaogan9A 5/3/2010 04.55 Jiuquan 63.4 1107 x 107 minutes Naval ELINT
1074km
Yaogan9B 5/3/2010 04.55 Jiuquan 63.4 1107 x 107 minutes Naval ELINT
1074km
Yaogan9C 5/3/2010 04.55 Jiuquan 63.4 1107 x 107 minutes Naval ELINT
1074km
Yaogan10 9/8/2010 22.49 Taiyuan 97.8 635 x 637 km 97.3 minutes Same as
1,3 SAR
Yaogan11 21/9/2010 02.42 Jiuquan NA NA NA NA
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The data also seem to suggest that the sun-
synchronous Yaogan 5 and Yaogan 6 satellites
are very similar and closely follow each other.
These may be optical reconnaissance satellites
with a slightly higher resolution than the Yaogan
2, Yaogan 4 and Yaogan 7 satellites. Public
statements attributed to Chinese experts suggest
an improvement in resolution from about 2 m
to 1.6 m.
Yaogan 8 stands out as an outlier which is not
similar to any of the other satellites in the Table.
It is possibly a satellite with a wide area coverage
optical sensor with a relatively coarser
resolution.
3.6 Review of Chinese Capabilities in Space
Figure 4 provides an overview of satellites
launched by China on a yearly basis. Figure 5
provides the same data as Figure 4, but in
cumulative terms. 8
From about 5 satellites per year – typical
numbers for the period 1990 to 2000 – the
number of launches has increased to reach 20
satellites in 2010.
Figures 6 and 7 provide annual and cumulative
space launch vehicle information for the period
1970 to 2010.
This data makes it clear that China’s capabilities
in space have significantly accelerated in the last
ten years. It is clear from the above analysis that
China has progressed substantially on the Space
Components of ASBM capability.9 With the
establishment of the three-satellite Large Area
Ocean Electronic Surveillance System, China has
moved from potential capability to operational
capability. This is a major advance and is the
most likely reason for the US concern and the
upward revision of its assessment of the status
of China’s ASBM.
4 Assessment of Integrated C4ISR
While the capabilities of the missile are crucial,
of equal importance to the effectiveness of the
ASBM system is the combined efficiency of the
Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
network. Figure 8 provides an overview of
the various information sources that need to
feed into an integrated C4ISR to target an
ASBM.
China has made strides in this field, especially
since the Gulf war when this was declared as
the major focus of the PLA’s modernisation. The
functioning of the ASBM system requires another
level of technological sophistication, with a
quantum increase in real time data-processing
demand and the need for  fusion of diverse data
networks such as satellite-based sensors,
ionospheric data, communication and data
networks, missile tracking radar as well as
ground-based, sea-based and airborne
intelligence sources. However not only the
Chinese but the US Department of Defense also
believe that this will be well within China’s
capability. Last year’s Annual China Report to
8 Data from http://members.jcom.home.ne.jp/ttsujino/space/chinalist_e.htm
9 For an overview of China’s space capabilities see Steven A. Smith, Lt Col, USAF, “Chinese Space Superiority? – China’s Military
Space Capabilities and the Impact of their Use in a Taiwan Conflict”, Research Report Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
Graduation Requirements, Air University Air War College, 17 February 2006.
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10 Annual Report To Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China-2010", http://
www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf p. 37 - “Over the long term, improvements in China’s C4ISR, including
space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the
western Pacific Ocean.” p.47 - “Specifically, China’s defense industries are pursuing advanced manufacturing, information
technology, and defense technologies. Examples include radar, counter-space capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart materials, and
low-observable technologies.”
Congress by the DoD specifically stated so in the context of China’s ASBM capability.10
Figure 4: Satellites Launched from Chine 1970-2010
Figure 5: China Satellite Launches Cumulative 1970-2010
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Figure 6: Number of Satellite Launch Vehicles per Year Chine 1970-2010
Figure 7: Number of Satellite Launch Vehicles - China Cumulative 1970-2010
PART II
DF-21 ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE
5.1 Analysis of Maneuver Requirements
This analysis is based on earlier work by the
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS)
on Chinese Ballistic Missiles.11 The DF-21 ballistic
missile is a variant of the Chinese JL-1 Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missile. Based on available
pictures of the JL-1 we had worked out suitable
procedures for determining the relevant missile
parameters. We had also developed a trajectory
model for determining the range. The advanced
version of this trajectory model includes not only
estimating the maximum range of a missile fired
11 S. Chandrashekar et al, “An Assessment of China’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles”, NIAS Study Report R4-07, 2007.
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Figure 8:
in any direction but also provides trajectories
needed for going from a point A to a point B.
Most pictures of the DF-21 available in the public
domain show the missiles inside a canister,
making it difficult to estimate the lengths and
diameters of this missile accurately. In the
present analysis we have used our best estimates
of propellant and stage masses that we had
obtained from available pictures of the JL-1. Our
earlier analysis had included a payload mass of
700 kg as the mass of the nuclear warhead of
the JL-1 missile.12
The ASBM differs fundamentally from the other
missiles in the DF21 series in that it carries a
conventional and not a nuclear weapon. This has
significant implications.
To cause any damage to the target the warhead
will have to directly impact on the carrier. This
would only be possible through the addition of
a terminal self-guidance capability. Such a missile
also requires a Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle
(MaRV) with a radar, an on board computer
and a system of thrusters as well as control
surfaces.
For an ASBM role, a conventional warhead would
have to be specifically designed to penetrate and
cause severe damage to the carrier with its
reinforced flight deck. An alternative solution is
12 See Reference 11, pp. 36-37.
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to rely on sub-munitions designed to spread
lighter but widespread damage to aircraft on
deck, the flight deck equipment and upper deck
electronics thereby achieving a “soft kill”. Such
an approach does not need deck penetration.
This option would also have the advantage of
reducing the criticality of pin-point accuracy.13
Our calculations are however based on the higher
mass “deck penetration” payload as the intention
is to analyse the viability of the concept using
conservative assumptions.
As a starting point for the current analysis of the
DF-21 in its anti-ship task we assume that this
mass of the MaRV would be about 1200 kg.14
The additional mass of 500 kg would be required
for replacing the nuclear warhead with a
conventional high explosive warhead that can
penetrate a carrier’s reinforced hull. Additional
sensors such as an on-board radar and
propulsion capabilities for terminal maneuvers
of the missile are also needed. The starting
assumption is that all of these can be
accommodated within the 1200 kg payload.
5.2 Assumptions
♦ Propellant weight of first stage 7686 kg
♦ Inert mass of stage 1 1574 kg
♦ Propellant mass of stage 2 4209 kg
♦ Inert mass stage 2 467 kg
♦ Warhead with all ASBM 1200 kg
capabilities
♦ The burn time assumed for stage 1 and stage
2 (both solid propellant) is 70 seconds each.
♦ The vacuum specific impulse assumed for
both stages is 280 seconds.
♦ Corrections for the change in specific
impulse with altitude have been
incorporated in the model.
♦ Drag corrections that vary with height and
air density and velocity of the missile are
also included.
♦ The model also takes care of earth rotation
effects.
♦ The launch site is located at 23 degrees 48
minutes. N latitude and 113 degrees 6
minutes E Longitude (around Qinyuan in
Guangdong province).
♦ The initial target location is 19 degrees N
Latitude and 131 degrees 42 minutes E
Longitude (ENE of Manila, Philippines).
♦ The range of the target from the launch site
for the above coordinates of launch station
and target is 1996 km.
♦ Launch azimuth would be east-south-east
from the launch location approximately 102
degrees Azimuth). The maximum range at
this azimuth would be 2007 km for the
1200 kg payload. This is close to the 2000
km range of the ASBM mentioned in various
publications. We can see that the target
distance from the launch station is 1996 km
which is very close to the maximum range
of 2007 km for the JL 1 / DF 21 unmodified
missile with a payload of 1200 kg.
13 A recent intelligence analysis published in the United States casts doubt on the future development plans of antiballistic missile
defence systems in the United States and Israel, and calls for a reassessment of the policymakers’ basic premises. The intelligence
analysis states that within a few years, China and North Korea will be able to develop ballistic missiles with blast fragmentation
warheads containing some 100 sub-munitions (similar to bomblet-filled cluster bombs), weighing about 5 kg each. [FBIS
Translated Text] http://www.fas.org/news/israel/nes95199.htm
14 Public domain information suggests that the range of the ASBM is about 2000 km. The 1200 kg payload was used as a starting
baseline because it provides a range of a little over 2000 km to an unmodified JL-1 / DF-21 missile.
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This makes it a very convenient and
appropriate starting point for our analysis.
(See Figure 9)
5.3 The Problem to be evaluated
During the descent phase of the missile’s ballistic
trajectory it obtains a better fix on the location
of the target. The revised target location would
be within the radius of uncertainty, comprising
mainly the error in the radar range and bearing,
as well as the motion of the target during the
missile’s time of flight. Assuming an OTH radar
error of 20kms, and a distance of 15kms traversed
by the target during the time of flight of the
missile, the radius of uncertainty works out to
be 25kms.15 The missile has then to execute a
maneuver during its flight which will enable it
to hit the target.
In principle the maneuver could be carried out
at any altitude. The velocity correction required
15 The Root mean square of the two errors from the OTH and the motion of the ship during the flight time of the missile is taken
as the final error.
Figure 9:
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to hit the target in its updated position will
depend on the velocity of the missile at that
point. The velocity in turn depends on the
altitude and increases as the missile comes closer
to its original impact point. So if the maneuver
is carried out early in the descent phase the
velocity correction and the requirement of fuel
that will have to be carried on the missile will
be less. If it is carried out later during the descent
phase the velocity correction and the fuel
requirement are both likely to increase.
The velocity correction would take some time –
of the order of a few seconds – during which the
missile is also moving. This aspect has also to
be considered. Once the missile comes to an
altitude below 75 km, aerodynamic drag and
heating become high. The functioning of the
radar on the missile may experience some
problems during some part of the re-entry phase
because of ionization. If further maneuvers are
required, the missile will also need to be
equipped with aerodynamic control surfaces for
stability and maneuverability. It may also require
to be slowed down by using retro rockets for
the aerodynamic surfaces to be effective. There
may also not be much time for the missile to
fully execute major maneuvers at altitudes below
75 km before it reaches the point of impact.
These are additional aspects that require more
specialist investigations.
One of the constraints that will determine the
time at which the maneuver should be carried
out will be the detection range of the radar on
board the missile. The weight and the power
requirements for such radars are likely to
increase depending on this range. Extrapolating
from airborne radars our estimate of the range
of a typical radar system that can be
accommodated within the weight and power
budgets of the missile would be 300 km. Our
analysis will try to evaluate the velocity
corrections that are needed at different altitudes
and at different ranges from the updated target
locations. Keeping in mind the constraints of the
radar system we will try to identify the range of
altitudes and velocities around which the
maneuver can be carried out. From these
considerations we will try and estimate the
amount of propellant required to carry out the
maneuver.
There are two ballistic trajectories available to
go from Point A to Point B. The shallow trajectory
may in general be preferred for tactical
considerations. If the target is close to the
maximum range as it is in our starting case there
may not be any significant difference between
the lofted and shallow trajectories.
5.4 Results of Baseline DF-21 Case
As we would expect when the range of the target
is very close to the maximum range of the missile
(2007 km maximum range – 1996 range of
target) there are no major differences between
the lofted and shallow trajectories
Selected data obtained from our trajectory
programme for the DF 21 unmodified missile for
the specified target is provided in Table 2 below.
The maximum values of slant range and velocity
corrections that are needed to go from the initial
target point to a revised target point that is
located around a radius of 25 km (the Area of
Uncertainty) from the initial target point are
taken for preparing this Table.
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The maximum altitude that the missile reaches
is 493 km. The geometry of our test case is such
that the slant range requirements from the
onboard radar dictate that the maneuver be
carried out at an altitude of between 200 km
and 150 km. The incremental velocity needed to
carry out the maneuver would be about 400 m
per second.16
The propellant required for such a maneuver
would be about 150 kg. This would mean that
the warhead, the on-board radar, re-entry
shielding, aerodynamic control surfaces,
navigation and control components as well as
the propulsion tank should all come within an
overall weight of about 950 kg.
5.5 Impact of the Reentry Vehicle size on the
DF-21 missile – the DF-21D Variant
The parallel studies on the Re-entry Vehicle
(See Annexure 2) indicate that in order to
accommodate the high impact warhead, an
autonomous radar-based navigation system,
the propellant and the power plant required
to maneuver the re-entry vehicle at altitudes
of 200 to 100 km and the aerodynamic surfaces
required for maneuvers below 50 km, the
weight of the re-entry vehicle would be about
1700 kg. This mass is about 500 kg more than
the mass of 1200 kg that we had assumed for
the re-entry vehicle earlier. We assume that the
re-entry vehicle mass would be about 1700 kg
rather than the 1200 kg we had assumed in
our first iteration. Annexure 2 provides some
details of how this mass requirement was
worked out.
To be able to launch this payload to a range of
over 2000 km – as is being proposed by the
Chinese – significant changes have to be made
to the DF-21 missile. The results of our
preliminary studies on these changes and their
implications are presented below.
When we replace the 1200 kg payload with a
1700 kg payload the maximum range for our
baseline DF-21 missile for a launch azimuth of
about 102 degrees is about 1381 km. This is
significantly lower than the 2000 km range talked
about in publicly available information on the
ASBM. In order to reach the 2000 km range with
some margins the DF-21 missile has therefore to
be modified. There are various ways in which
this missile can be modified. One approach could
be to add a small third stage to the DF-21.
Another way is to incorporate a liquid engine
module in the RV. This option would be
Table 2: RESULTS BASELINE JL-1 / DF-21 CASE
Velocity Changes for 25 km Error in Position Lofted / Shallow Trajectory – DF-21 1200 kg Warhead
Time of Maneuver Slant Range Velocity Total Flight Time from Velocity at
Maneuver From Altitude (km) to Revised increment Time (sec) maneuver to maneuver
Launch (sec) Target (km) (metres/sec) impact (sec)
758 200 337 300 839 81 3.58
780 150 256 410 839 59 3.70
802 100 175 639 839 37 3.83
812 75 135 851 839 27 3.89
16 As we can see from the Table the estimated values are between 300 and 410 metres per second.
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equivalent to using the warhead itself as a third
stage.
These options were studied. However the
preliminary analyses of these options indicate that
the additional weight that has to be carried by the
missile at lift-off reduces the range below 2000
km. Therefore these options of adding a third stage
or converting the warhead into a 3rd stage do not
look attractive from a technical point of view. It is
therefore likely that the first and second stages
of the existing DF-21 missile would have been
modified to provide the increase in range for
launching a 1700 kg warhead. Different
combinations of extended first and second stages
of the baseline DF-21 were analysed to come up
with a configuration that would be able to carry a
payload of 1700 kg to a range of a little over 2000
km. Table 3 provides details of a missile that
provides a range of 2232 km.
The configuration above can be arrived at from
the basic DF-21 missile by adding 3000 kg of
propellant to its first stage and about 1400 kg of
propellant to its second stage rocket motor. The
addition of this propellant will increase the
length of the first stage rocket motor of the
DF-21 from a value of 4.3 m to 6 m. The length
of the second stage rocket motor will also
increase from 1.5 m to 2 m.
5.6 Maneuver Requirements Revisited
Based on the above sizing of the DF-21D the
maneuver requirements for the warhead have
been evaluated again. As mentioned earlier the
maximum range that can be achieved by such a
missile launched at an azimuth of about 102
degrees is 2232 km. Using the same launch site
location and the same target that we had used
earlier we have re-run the trajectory keeping the
initial position of the target at the same
location17 but maneuvering the missile during
flight to hit the revised target position which lies
within a 25 km radius of uncertainty. The relevant
details from these trajectory runs are presented
in Table 4 for the shallow trajectory case and
Table 5 for the lofted trajectory case.
Table 3: Possible Configuration of DF-21 D ASBM Missile
Parameter Value
Mass of Propellant first stage motor (Kg) 10686 Kg
Inert Mass of first stage (Kg) 2188 Kg
Vacuum specific impulse first stage (Sec) 280 seconds
Mass of propellant second stage motor (Kg) 5609 Kg
Inert Mass of second stage (Kg) 622 Kg
Vacuum specific impulse second stage (Sec) 280 seconds
Payload mass (Kg) 1700 Kg
Lift off Weight Kg 20806 Kg
Range for azimuth of 102 degrees (Km) 2232 Km
Estimated length of 1st stage rocket motor 6 m
Estimated length of second stage 2.25 m
17 The range from the launch site to the target is about 1996 km.
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For the shallow trajectory case, a maneuver at
100 km altitude meets the range limit of 300 km
required by the radar onboard the missile. The
additional velocity required to carry out the
maneuver to hit the target works out to be 400
metres per second. Assuming that a velocity
correction of about 425 metres per sec is needed
the propellant required for the maneuver of a
1700 kg warhead would be about 230 kg. This
would still provide a mass of more than 1450 kg
to accommodate all the other requirements of
the warhead. The maximum altitude reached by
the shallow trajectory is 247 km.
A maneuver carried out at an altitude of 200 km
would require a velocity correction of about 371
m per sec for the lofted trajectory case. This is not
significantly different from the shallow trajectory
case though the maneuver can start at higher
altitude of above 200 km. The maximum altitude
reached for the lofted trajectory is 690 km. The
time available between maneuver and impact are
also approximately the same for both the lofted
and shallow trajectory cases - 62 to 65 seconds.
From the analyses of these two cases we can
conclude that a velocity correction of 425 metres
per second would suffice for both the lofted and
shallow trajectory cases.
5.7 DF 21D Image Measurement Substantiate
Analysis
The parameters in Table 3 of the modifications
visualized to the DF-21D ASBM are derived from
knowledge about the parameters of the earlier
DF-21 missile variants based on image analysis
supplemented by other information available in
the public domain. One way to evaluate the
correctness of our analysis for the DF-21D is to
validate our findings by checking our conclusions
with independent measurements made on
Table 4: Velocity Changes for 25 km Error in Position
Shallow Trajectory - DF-21D 1700 kg Warhead
Time of Maneuver Slant Range Velocity Total Flight Time from Velocity at
Maneuver From Altitude (km) to Revised increment Time (sec) maneuver to maneuver
Launch (sec) Target (km) (metres/sec) impact (sec)
483 200 649 163 637 154 3.86
535 150 445 246 637 102 3.98
575 100 285 400 637 62 4.10
592 75 213 554 637 45 4.16
Table 5: Velocity Changes for 25 km Error in Position
Lofted Trajectory - DF-21D 1700 kg Warhead
Time of Maneuver Slant Range Velocity Total Flight Time from Velocity at
Maneuver From Altitude (km) to Revised increment Time (sec) maneuver to maneuver
Launch (sec) Target (km) (metres/sec) impact (sec)
909 200 284 371 974 65 3.72
928 150 212 511 974 46 3.85
944 100 148 771 974 30 3.97
953 75 116 1041 974 21 4.03
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images available in the public domain. A search
for images of the DF-21D provided one very good
image (Fig.10) of a number of missiles mounted
on their Transportable Erector Launcher (TEL)
vehicles.18 Since these TEL vehicles are derived
from the Russian MAZ TELs with known
dimensions 19 they can be used to determine the
lengths of the various parts of the DF-21D
missile, especially the lengths of the rocket
motors of the first and second stages.
The measurements derived from the above image
are provided in Table 6 below. The Table also
provides the average measurements as well as
the original measurements on images of the
earlier variants of the DF-21 missile from the best
image measurements that have been made at
NIAS.20
The measured length of the DF-21D variant of
13.34 m is longer than the lengths of the various
variants of the DF 21 that we had seen earlier.
As per our calculations (see Table 3) to
accommodate the ASBM payload of 1700 kg and
to be able to reach a range of 2000 km both the
first and second stages of the earlier unmodified
JL 1 / DF 21 missile had to be stretched by
adding more propellants to both of them. Since
the diameter for both the original DF21 and the
ASBM variant is the same, the addition of
propellant will increase the length of the first
stage from 4.3 m in the earlier version to 6 m in
the ASBM DF 21D variant. From Table 6 the
measured length of 6.10 m for the first stage
motor is only 10 cm more than the length of 6 m
that we had arrived at by calculation. Thus the
18 For a copy of the image see http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/anti-carrier-missile.jpg
19 The MAZ TEL Soviet heritage TEL has a distance of 2.2 m between the centres of two wheels. The Chinese TELs are derived from
this MAZ TEL. 2.2 m has been used as the benchmark length for our measurements on the image
20 Reference 11 pp. 36-37
Figure10:
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measurement from the image is quite consistent
with our calculation for the first stage rocket
motor of the DF 21D variant.
In the same way the upper stage lengths of the
DF 21 D ASBM variant is quite close to the value
(difference of 5 cm) we obtained from our
calculations. This is seen in Table 6.
Measurements from the image of the DF-21D are
therefore very consistent with our calculation of
lengths based on our approach to the problem
of the ASBM. The real DF 21D as seen in the
image appears to be close to what we would
expect if the earlier version of the DF 21 has
been modified for the ASBM function.
The warhead + interface length of 3.21 m has
been seen in earlier versions of the DF-21.
However while the length may have been the
same the layout and arrangement of the DF-21D
warhead appears to be different. The image of
the earlier variant of the DF-21 which had a
measured warhead + interface length of 3.21 m
reproduced below (Fig.11) has a significantly
different warhead. Annexure 2 provides some
details about the warhead based on our
investigations so far.
Overall the DF-21D appears to be a missile that
is significantly different from all earlier variants
of the DF-21. Based on this work we can make
certain predictions about the DF 21D variant of
the D 21 missile.
5.8 Tentative Predictions about the DF-21D
Missile
♦ Missile diameter 1.4 m
♦ Overall length of the missile about
13.5 m
♦ Overall weight of the missile ~21 tonnes
♦ First stage motor length a little over 6 m
♦ First stage propellant mass about 10700 kg
♦ Second stage length including nozzle about
2.25 m
♦ Second stage propellant mass about
5600 kg
♦ Range with a payload of 1700 kg about
2200 km
Table 6: Comparison of Measurements between DF-21D & JL-1 / DF-21 Variants





2.3 m, 3.21 m, 3.7 m &
5.13 m
3.21 m 4 types of warheads seen earlier. DF-21D variant close
to one of them.
Upper stage +
Interface
1.79 m (average) 2.25 m Upper stage length longer by about 0.5 m consistent
with increase in propellant loading of stage 2 from
calculation.
Stage 1 Motor 4.3 m (Average) 6.10 m Stage 1 rocket motor longer by about 1.8 m in DF-21D.
Consistent with increase in length of 1.7 m obtained
from calculation.
Nozzle / shroud 0.89 m (average) 1.78 m Not inconsistent with DF-21D
Length 9.3, 10.2, 10.7 and
12.1 m - 4 variants.
13.34 m The DF-21D is a longer variant that is consistent with a
range of 2000 km + with a 1700 kg payload.
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♦ Total flight time of about 640 seconds for
shallow and about 980 seconds for the
lofted trajectory case.21
♦ The warhead must have a high thrust
capability engine system that provides a
quick correction to the missile velocity. The
dynamics of this correction and its
implications need more investigation.
5.9 Conventional Warhead – Effect on Missile
Design Options
Accuracy
A missile with a conventional warhead needs to
be far more accurate than a nuclear-tipped
weapon for obvious reasons. It is difficult to strike
a moving target from a range of over 2000 kms.
This is only possible if there is terminal guidance
from either internal or external data inputs. Last
minute updates are necessary because of the
errors in each component of the ASBM system –
the OTH radar, the errors accumulated during
flight of the missile, and the errors caused by
the movement of the target. The requirement of
data input can be met from a global positioning
system and /or by an on-board radar.
The mean CEP of a medium range ballistic missile
in unguided flight is 250-300m. This can be
improved dramatically as shown by the US
modifications to the Pershing and the USSR’s
SS-20 missile.
The CEP of the ASBM is therefore of crucial
importance. In order to strike the target (a) the
CEP of the ASBM would have to be half the beam
or less. (b) The onboard computer should be
steering the missile at the future position of the
target based on updates during the terminal
stage.
It would be useful to recall that the US Pershing
Mark II reportedly had a CEP of 50 meters in
Figure11:
21 One of the articles quoted in the literature talks of a flight time of 930 seconds – could be a reference to the lofted trajectory
case. Our analysis does not suggest any major differences in terms of maneuver requirements between the lofted and shallow
trajectories. The time interval between maneuver and impact is also not very different. From a tactical perspective a shallow
trajectory may be preferred.
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198722. In 2003, the US Navy had requested for
funding for the E2 RV with a conventional
warhead for the Trident II D SLBM, with an
accuracy of 10 meters. This was after Lockheed
Martin had demonstrated the previous year that
the new reentry vehicle could steer towards a
target and strike with improved accuracy.23
There are clear indications that China has been
working on enhancing the accuracy of its
missiles starting with the DF-15, which without
any guidance has a CEP of around 300 meters.
This is similar to the early unguided Pershing,
which was improved as stated above to 50m
over a few years. In 1996 the Wall Street
Journal published a report by an analyst
quoting an engineer from the Beijing Research
Inst i tute for  Telemetry that  China was
enhancing the accuracy of the DF-15 with
global positioning satellite technology, and
stated that with guidance from a GPS the D-
15 could “perhaps become the most accurate
battlefield missile in the world.”24 This of
course is a dated report and therefore things
could have only gotten better. China has by all
accounts made impressive strides in technology
in the last  decade and a half  s ince that
assessment. Considering that the accuracy of
10m was projected by the US  for an ICBM of
over 7000 km range in 2003, the possibility of
a similar MaRv being built by China for a 2000
km MRBM is entirely feasible, even allowing
for the technology lag that China has in
relation to the US.
Nature of Munitions
Notwithstanding all efforts to attain pin-point
accuracy, and even allowing for salvo firings of
the ASBM, the “soft kill” option is an attractive
one against a target as robust and as damage-
resistant as an aircraft carrier. The adoption of
the “soft kill” option, (the disablement of the
mission capability of the warship rather than its
actual damage or destruction as with
conventional munitions) has distinct advantages.
In this option the unitary warhead is replaced
by a warhead which ejects up to a thousand sub-
munitions (bomblets) over a wide area, causing
severe damage to soft targets such as aircraft on
deck, unarmoured vehicles such as flight-deck
tenders, and weather-deck radio and electronic
equipment, masts and antennae. This kind of
damage would certainly make a carrier incapable
of its primary function and put it out of action.
Sub-munition warheads reduce the mass of
explosive needed to be carried by the missile.
They also simplify the design of the warhead
which would otherwise have to have the
capability to penetrate the thick steel and
22 http://www.fas.org/spp/aircraft/part04.htm
23 Grossman, Elaine M, “Pentagon Eyes Bunker-Busting Conventional Ballistic Missile for Subs,” Inside the Pentagon, June 27,
2002.p. 1. See also, Robert S. Norris and Hans M.Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Forces 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
January/February 2005, pp. 73-75.
24 Richard D. Fisher Jr., “China‘s Missile Threat“ Wall Street Journal 30 Dec 1997 http://www.fas.org/news/china/1996/
msg00039b.htm “China is working hard to improve the accuracy of its missiles. At November air show in Zhuhai, China, an
engineer from the Beijing Research Institute for Telemetry, an organization working on advanced guidance systems, told this
analyst that China is enhancing the accuracy of the DF-15 with global positioning satellite technology. The U.S. already relies
heavily on such technology to convey pinpoint accuracy to aircraft, missiles and bombs. Published estimates give the DF-15 an
accuracy measured in a “circular error probability” of 300 meters, or within a circle with a 300-meter radius. This figure is
already fairly accurate by current standards for this class of missile. With global positioning satellite inputs, the DF-15 could
perhaps become the most accurate battlefield missile in the world.”
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concrete flight deck.25 Finally, the soft kill option
would be less likely to invite escalation that the
loss of an aircraft carrier - the symbol of US might-
might evoke.
5.10 Other Considerations
In our analyses we have assumed that the
velocity corrections are carried out
instantaneously. In actual practice the velocity
correction would take some time – of the order
of a few seconds – during which the missile is
also moving. With thrusters that can provide
about 7500 Newtons of thrust and having two
of them in any direction about 15000 Newtons
of thrust may be available every second. For the
maneuver a minimum of eight of them located
in the positive and negative pitch and yaw planes
may be needed. From these considerations it
would appear that the maneuver would take
about 10 seconds. If the thruster is made bigger
this time can come down. This aspect and the
dynamics of motion during the thrusting phase
have to be modeled and understood.
Once the missile comes to an altitude below
75 km, aerodynamic drag and heating become
high. The functioning of the radar on the missile
may experience some problems during some part
of the re-entry phase because of the formation
of an ionized plasma sheath around the missile
that affects radio waves. Our preliminary
evaluation is that for typical speeds of reentry
for the DF 21 D of around 4 km per second this
may not be a major problem. Radio frequencies
below about 285 MHz might not be seriously
affected. In case higher frequencies have to be
used there are a number of technical solutions
that can be used. For a 4 km per second reentry
velocity even this may not be needed.
If further maneuvers are required, after the
missile comes below 75 km, the missile will also
need to be equipped with aerodynamic control
surfaces for stability and maneuverability. It may
also require to be slowed down by using retro
rockets for the aerodynamic surfaces to be
effective. There may also not be much time for
the missile to fully execute major maneuvers at
altitudes below 75 km before it reaches the point
of impact.
All these are additional aspects that require more
specialist investigations.
5.11 Summary of Analysis of Missile
Requirement
Evaluation of the older variants of the DF 21 led
to the conclusion that they were not compatible
with the performance characteristics needed for
the ASBM. The DF 21 needs to be significantly
modified for it to attain the enhanced
performance parameters required for an ASBM.
Onboard radar, terminal maneuvering equipment
and an increase in the mass of explosive are
needed for the ASBM function. The increased mass
and dimension of the Re-entry Vehicle and the
fuel requirement were independently evaluated.
This input was used to arrive at a revised 2 stage
variant of the original baseline DF 21 missile.
Revised trajectory runs on this variant provided
more refined inputs that confirmed that the
performance parameters could be achieved.
25 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1028/MR1028.sum.pdf “An 1,100-pound M-9 ballistic-
missile warhead covers almost eight times the area when using a submunition warhead than when using a unitary warhead. The
combination of increased accuracy from GPS guidance and increased warhead efficiency is what decreases the number of
missiles required to attack USAF airbases from hundreds to dozens.”
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To cross-check the validity of the theoretical
modifications, we compared the external
dimensional characteristics of the two stages of
the missile derived from our calculations with
measurements made on a picture of the ASBM
(DF 21 D) that was available. We found that there
was close correspondence between the
dimensions derived from our calculations and the
measurements made on the image. This confirms
that the DF 21D is a real variant of the DF 21
family of missiles that can indeed perform an
ASBM function.
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the DF-
21D missile is capable of the performance it is
credited with in terms of range and payload. With
onboard radar and the addition of control
surfaces the missile will acquire terminal self-
guidance and velocity correction capability. Such
a reentry vehicle can achieve the required
“Circular Error Probable” that would give it a
high hit probability. In addition the use of sub-
munitions would diminish the stringency of the
CEP requirement and also give the missile a “soft
kill” capability. These parameters need to
demonstrated during the trials which are yet to
be carried out, in order to establish the




The development of the Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM) by China has been known for a
number of years. However, real concern in the
US and the Pacific region began to manifest itself
in 2009, after several broadcasts in the Chinese
media talked about the new counter to the US
Navy’s aircraft carrier. The most authoritative
publicly expressed view was provided in
December 2010 when the C-in-C US Pacific
Command stated in an interview that in his view
China’s ASBM had attained Initial Operational
Capability, and that it would probably take a few
years more of trials before the missile becomes
fully operational. In this part we examine some
strategic causes and effects of the development
of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile by China.
Annexure 3 provides a Chinese perspective on
how an ASBM would be used operationally to
counter the threat posed by CSGs.
Chinese Perspective
It would be an over-simplification to suppose
that objective of re-absorption of Taiwan into
China was the main driver of the ASBM
development programme. While this was no
doubt a factor, the ASBM’s impact on maritime
strategy and operations go far beyond the bounds
of a littoral conflict. The successful deployment
of the ASBM by China would impact geo-political
equations not only in the Western Pacific but
globally – so central is the carrier to America’s
power projection capability.
China’s resort to a land-based long-range
weapon against American sea power appears
to be a logical choice. China could never
have hoped to match the US Navy at sea, or
withstand sustained air strikes by its formidable
carrier-borne aircraft. It has adroitly avoided
both these weaknesses and produced an
“assassin’s mace” solution. In the near term,
the ASBM when it attains full operational status
will serve as a credible deterrent against
American intervention in China’s maritime
disputes, of which it has several with its Asian
neighbours.
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Being a conventional weapon, the ASBM for the
first time gives China the capability of a
graduated response to the CSG threat. If sub-
munitions which do not aim to destroy the
carrier but only to disable it are used, it further
increases the graded response capability. China
can then claim that the ASBM is a defensive
weapon that minimises the chance of escalation
of the conflict.
US and Allied Perspective
Opinions about the viability of the weapon and
its impact on the maritime and geo-political
situation range from scepticism to alarm. To a
large extent, the scepticism has centred around
China’s technological capability. But as the US
Admiral has said, China’s capabilities and rate
of progress have always been higher than they
have been credited with.
To counter the developing ASBM threat the US
has taken a number of steps. For the most part
these consist of redeployment of existing assets
to strengthen the Pacific Fleet, especially in the
area of missile defence. The US already has a
program for increasing the number of BMD-
capable ships from 18 in 2009 to 43 in 202026.
This is in accordance with the decisions taken
before the ASBM threat appeared on the horizon,
which is sought to be met by re-deploying these
BMD assets.
From the measures that have already been taken
it is clear that the defence against the missile
will be enormously expensive, nor will it be fail-
safe. The US Navy can no longer dispatch its
CSGs without a careful appraisal of the risks
involved. Additional defensive measures such as
Aegis-capable escorts will push the costs up by
several hundred billion dollars to meet a threat
that costs a fraction of that amount. In an article
published by the US Naval War College Review
last year, Marshall Hoyler has made a detailed
estimate of the equation between the anti-missile
defence capability of the US Pacific Fleet versus
China’s ASBMs, and concludes that with the
projected deployable assets on both sides, this
would leave the balance of numerical advantage
heavily in favour of China till 2015.27
The situation will also increase nervousness
among US allies in Asia, who are already
apprehensive about China’s growing power.
There is the possibility that China will become
more belligerent in the resolution of its
disputes, and that its “peaceful rise” will be less
peaceful.
Implications for Maritime Strategy
Current naval strategy recognizes that for a
maritime power to be able to operate at will in
distant waters it needs integral air power, and
the aircraft carrier is central to that precept. The
advent of the ASBM does not in any way dilute
this principle. But what it does do is to
complicate the task of keeping that air power
integral with the fleet. Future carrier strike groups
may consist not of one super-carrier with many
escorts, but several small carriers with many of
the escorts’ capabilities. A land-based weapon
26 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” Congressional
Research Service Report – Jun 23rd 2011
27 Marshall Hoyler, “China’s “Antiaccess” Ballistic Missiles And U.S. Active Defense 2010” Naval War College Review, Autumn
2010, Vol. 63, No. 4.
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may be able to achieve sea denial over some part
of the sea for a certain time, but it cannot give a
country sea control. For a country to maintain
sea control, (to be able to use the sea as well as
to deny it to the adversary) it needs sea-based
platforms. Thus the very strength that China is
acquiring may also expose its own weakness. This
is because the trajectory of China’s development
and its westward economic expansion makes it
more dependent on parts of the world ocean over
which it has no control, and over which control
can only be achieved by building a fleet with its
integral air power.
Implications for Nuclear Stability
The response to a detected incoming ballistic
missile would be the most difficult problem
for a commander at sea in an operational
environment involving both nuclear as well as
conventionally-tipped ballistic missiles. In the
case of an incoming missile being reported, the
commander of the carrier will only have seconds
to decide whether he is under a nuclear attack
and to take appropriate action. This obviously
makes for a high-risk situation with an increased
probability of a nuclear response to a
conventional attack. The US discovered exactly
the same issue in 2005 when the Air Force and
the Navy both proposed the deployment of long
range ballistic missiles with conventional
warheads. Whereas the military did outline some
measures that they said would obviate the risk,
a Congressional Research Service report
acknowledged that the risk of a conventional
ballistic missile launch being presumed to be a
nuclear attack was real.28
The deployment of the ASBM will be met by
intensification of BMD measures by the US and
its regional allies. China has protested
strenuously against Theatre Missile Defence
plans in its region as it considers that this will
dilute the value of its own strategic deterrent.
Another effect of the development of the ASBM
has been to renew Russia’s misgivings about the
INF treaty of 1987, whereby the US and the USSR
both voluntarily eliminated all intermediate
range missiles, and now have no missiles in the
range bracket of 500-5500 kms. It is likely that
Russia will withdraw from the Treaty and feel
compelled to arm itself with IRBMs. This could
start another round in the presently discontinued
missile competition. The deployment of the
ASBM will thus have an overall negative impact
on nuclear stability and may lead to an
accelerated arms procurement programme on all
sides.
Possible Countermeasures
Essentially the countermeasures against such a
weapon fall into one of two categories – active
and passive.
Active countermeasures can be aimed at the
surveillance and tracking systems, the missile
launch systems, or the missile arsenals. This
would include the disablement of the OTH
radars, or the tracking and communication
satellites system by jamming or other means.
Missile launch and missile arsenals may be
subjected to neutralisation from the air which is
a course of action fraught with high political risk
28 Amy F Wolf Specialist in Nuclear Weapon Policy, “Conventional Warheads for Long-range Ballistic Missiles – Issues for
Congress” Congressional Research Service Paper Jan 26 2009.
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and presents military difficulties. Long-distance
precision guided weapons are the most likely
option.
Passive countermeasures are countermeasures
that are taken after missile launch to destroy,
decoy or evade the missile. The acquisition of
Anti Missile Defence (AMD) systems involves
enormous expenditure; but the US has already
planned to strengthen its AMD in cooperation
with its regional allies, and this expenditure has
already been planned for the 20-year period
starting in 2010, after the last Ballistic Missile
Defence (BMD) Review by the US President. It
is therefore unlikely that the US will rely purely
on passive means as this would leave all the
initiative with the adversary, and also involve
the risk of AMD systems being overwhelmed by
sheer numbers since they are spread thin among
the various assets that have to be defended.
Either way there are no easy options. There is
little doubt that there will be intense diplomatic
activity to avoid actual confrontation. China is
not likely to make the mistake of assuming that
US Carriers would stay away from the Western
Pacific because of the ASBM.
PART IV CONCLUSION
This study has examined China’s capability to
design and develop an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
directed against an Aircraft Carrier Strike Group
(CSG), and to create the technical infrastructure
to transform this into an operational weapon
system.
It is clear from the study that over the last decade
China has intensified efforts to create a
constellation of satellites with the necessary
attributes and sensors to provide all-weather
data about ships over a wide ocean area. These
include infra-red, synthetic aperture radar, and
optical sensors with the necessary earth links to
transmit data to operational authorities. It also
includes a new large area ocean ELINT satellite
launched in May 2010 that would provide
advance warning of the arrival of a CSG and its
location. While this system may not yet be
complete, there is enough indication that it has
reached an advanced stage. This may be the
reason why the US has stated that the ASBM
has entered the initial operational phase. The
space-based component is backed up by an Over-
the-Horizon (OTH) radar system that provides
real time information on the location of the CSG.
The study projects that the error in the location
of the carrier from all these assets for a missile
to target an aircraft carrier can be conservatively
estimated to be 25 km.
The missile has also been studied to the extent
information is available in the public domain.
Based on an evaluation of the warhead
requirements for an anti-ship mission that
includes an autonomous onboard radar with
navigation and maneuver capabilities, an
onboard propulsion system with sufficient fuel
for reaching a mobile target as well as other
requirements such as aerodynamic surfaces for
terminal phase maneuvers, the warhead weight
works out to be 1700 kg.
The assessment is that a missile of the DF-21
family can be modified to meet the mission
requirements of an intermediate range anti-ship
missile with a range of about 2000 km and a
payload of about 1700 kg. The modifications
needed to the known parameters of a typical
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JL-1/DF-21 variant to strike a carrier have also
been studied and the increases in the first stage
and second stage masses of the existing JL-1 /
DF-21 have been worked out. Measurements
have also been made on a DF-21 D (ASBM)
image available in the public domain. There is a
good match between measurements and our
predictions for the first and second stage
lengths made from trajectory considerations.
This does add credibility to Chinese claims on
the ASBM.
Taking into account the space components, the
OTH radar system as well as the readiness or
near readiness of the DF21 Anti Ship Ballistic
Missile it would appear that China has achieved
an asymmetric equalizer to US carrier-based
power projection capability.
While it is true that the ASBM has dramatically
challenged the core of US sea power in the
Pacific, it would be hasty and erroneous to
predict China’s supremacy over the region. The
reality is that the US is two decades ahead of
China in technology and has an alliance network
that is a huge force multiplier in a conflict.
Countermeasures to the ASBM are neither self-
evident nor easy to adopt. Both passive and
active means have their l imitations and
disadvantages. Whatever be the combination of
measures that the US chooses, it would appear
that the ASBM has already achieved part of the
intended effect by forcing a re-evaluation of the
military equation and injecting an element of
uncertainty in what was an unchallenged military
scenario for the United States.
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Introduction
Beyond-the-horizon detection of terrestrial
targets at ranges of thousands of kilometers can
be achieved by radars operating in the high-
frequency (HF) band (3 to 30 MHz). This very
long range coverage is obtained by using sky
wave propagation that is, reflecting the radar
signals from the ionosphere. Figures 1a, 1b, and
1c reveals that different range extents are
illuminated by using different operating
frequencies, with longer starting ranges requiring
higher frequencies.
Annexure 1
HF Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Radar
Figure 12: Ray-tracing through a model ionosphere, showing the variation of the radar footprint with carrier
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Limitations of conventional Radar
Technology
Radio waves, a form of electromagnetic
radiation, tend to travel in straight lines. This
generally limits the detection range of radar
systems to objects on their horizon due to the
curvature of the Earth. For example, radar
mounted on top of a 10 m (33 ft) must have a
range to the horizon of about 13 kilometers,
taking into account atmospheric refraction
effects. If the target is above the surface, this
range will be increased accordingly, so a target
10 m (33 ft) high can be detected by the same
radar at 26 km. In general it is impractical to
build radar systems with line-of-sight ranges
beyond a few hundred kilometers. OTH radars
use various techniques to see beyond the
horizon, making them particularly useful in the
early warning radar role.
Use of Ionospheric Reflections in OTH
Radar
The most common method of constructing OTH
radar is the use of ionosphere reflection. Given
certain conditions in the atmosphere, radio
signals broadcast up towards the ionosphere will
be reflected back towards the ground. After
reflection off the atmosphere, a small amount of
the signal will reflect off the ground back towards
the sky, and a small proportion of that back
towards the broadcaster. Only one range of
frequencies regularly exhibits this behavior. This
is the high frequency (HF) or shortwave part of
the spectrum from 3 – 30 MHz. Given certain
conditions in the atmosphere, radio signals in
this frequency range will be reflected back
towards the ground. The “correct” frequency to
use depends on the current conditions of the
atmosphere, so systems using ionospheric
reflection typically employ real-time monitoring
of the reception of backscattered signals to
continuously adjust the frequency of the
transmitted signal.
Since the signal reflected from the ground, or
sea, will be very large compared to the signal
reflected from a “target”, some system needs to
be used to distinguish the targets from the
background noise. The easiest way to do this is
to use the Doppler Effect, which uses frequency
shift created by moving objects to measure their
velocity. By filtering out the entire backscatter
signal close to the original transmitted frequency,
moving targets become visible. This basic
concept is used in almost all modern radars,
but in the case of OTH systems it becomes
considerably more complex due to similar effects
introduced by movement of the ionosphere itself.
Waveforms for the HF Radar
The factors that govern the choice of waveform
in HF radar systems can be grouped into two
classes. First, there are the considerations
common to microwave radar that is, range and
Doppler resolution as described by the ambiguity
function and optimized for target detection
and estimation, realizability in hardware,
susceptibility to interference, efficiency, and the
electrical properties of the scatterers of interest.
The waveforms used in most operational HF
skywave radars are variations on the periodic
linear frequency-modulated continuous wave
(LFM-CW) signal. Often, there is some provision
for amplitude shaping, normally at the
commencement and end of each sweep. The
Jindalee radar was designed with the facility to
apply a number of amplitude notches within the
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sweep, thereby enabling the radar to sweep at
zero amplitude across narrow-band users in
the same frequency band without causing
interference. Another class of variations involves
departing from a linear frequency modulation.
By varying the frequency-time characteristic of
the waveform, range side- lobes can be reduced
and spectral leakage can be controlled.
Controlling the phase discontinuity from the end
of one sweep to the beginning of the next
provides another dimension in which the
waveform properties can be optimized. Further
generalization of the FM-CW waveform is
possible by relaxing the condition that the
waveform be periodic. This is a powerful tool
for controlling range-ambiguous echoes, which
can be shifted about in the range-Doppler plane
to uncover previously obscured target echoes.
Perhaps most importantly, in the congested HF
spectrum where clear channels of adequate
bandwidth to achieve the desired resolution
may be scarce, FM-CW waveforms defined over
two or more separate sub-bands are readily
synthesized.
The Receiving System
The receiving system is defined here to embrace
only the receiving antenna array and the receivers
that convert the antenna outputs to discrete time
series, usually at base- band.
There are many demands on the receivers for
OTH radar, including high dynamic range,
linearity, wide bandwidth, and uniformity
between receivers when used in multi receiver
systems. For most civil aircraft and ships, target
radar cross section (RCS) at HF is roughly of the
same order as the microwave RCS, that is, ~10–
20 dBsm for aircraft and ~30–50 dBsm for ships,
but the range is 10–100 times greater, so the
extra loss associated with R–4 is in the range
40–80 dB. Moreover, each target echo is
immersed in clutter from the illuminated
footprint, which may have an area of many
thousands of square kilometers. Further, the HF
signal environment includes (one-way)
transmissions from powerful radio stations
around the world, as discussed in the previous
section. Imperfections in the receiver result in
some of this noise and clutter energy being
superimposed on the wanted radar echoes,
either additively or multiplicatively. Hence,
careful attention to receiver design is imperative
if the radar designer wishes to avoid self-inflicted
performance limitations.
Attempts to reduce contamination from external
broadcast signals by inserting narrowband filters
at the receiver front-end, sacrifice the high agility
that is needed when the radar is changing
frequency, typically by several MHz, second by
second, as it jumps between tasks. There are also
penalties from (i) filter switching time, (ii)
settling time, (iii) distortion caused by group
delay dispersion, and (iv) reduced reliability
when there are hundreds of receivers. Further,
each channel will need to account for the gain
and phase variation for each filter, increasing the
overheads on band switching. It is better to zero
in on the bandwidth of interest by non-switched
filters later in the receiver, using a variable
frequency local oscillator to position the
desired sub-band(s) over the selective filters. Of
course the switched LO can also suffer from
imperfections, but only one local oscillator is
needed, as opposed to hundreds of receivers.
Whichever design path is followed, the demands
on receiver linearity and spurious free dynamic
range are extreme.
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Performance Evaluation for an ASBM
Application
The specifications of the Chinese OTH radar
are not available from public sources. Based
on a review of the literature and information
on existing radars an evaluation of the
along track and across track resolution has
been carried out. Conservatively this would
suggest that the CSG can be located at distances
of 2000 to 3000 km within a radius of
20 km.
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Reentry vehicles in general (and therefore DF-
21 D will not be an exception) reach hypersonic
speeds in their flight trajectory and controlling
them and guiding them to their targets is quite a
challenge. Ballistic missiles earmarked for nuclear
weapon delivery do not need a very high order
of targeting accuracy as the damage area of the
weapon is large. In the case of missiles carrying
conventional weapons, on the other hand a high
order of target placement accuracy is essential.
This necessitates the requirement of steerability
to the reentry body, which can prove to be
quite a challenge as the body will be rapidly
decelerating and the reentry flight duration will
be small.
1. The Reentry conditions
The environment experienced by a reentry
vehicle is quite hostile in terms of the velocity,
deceleration and the stagnation point heat
transfer. These parameters are dependent upon
the ballistic coefficient of the vehicle. The ballistic
coefficient, β is defined as the mass of the vehicle
divided by the product of the drag coefficient
and the reference area. The reference area in the
case of a reentry vehicle will be its base area
and for normal designs, the value of β ranges
from 500 to 1000 lb-m/ft2. Typical data taken
from reference 1 is depicted in figure 13.
2. DF-21 D Reentry Vehicle
The DF-21 D image sourced from the internet
and the dimensions derived from the image are
shown in figure 14.
The RV structure is a cylinder-cone construction
with a spherical nose cap. The reference diameter
of the RV is found to be 1.4 m and the radius of
Annexure 2
Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle for DF-21 D
Figure 13: Reentry Parameters
a. Velocity (ft/sec) b. Deceleration (g) c. Stagnation Point Heat Transfer
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the nose cap as 0.35 m. The ratio of the nose
radius to the base radius, called the bluntness
ratio is a useful aerodynamic parameter and
works out to 0.5 for the missile RV The drag
coefficient and the lift to drag ratio of the RV are
dependent upon the bluntness ratio.
At the reentry speeds shown in figure 1, it is
difficult to maneuver the RV to its target.
Consequently, it becomes necessary to reduce the
reentry velocity, preferably to subsonic levels in
order to steer the RV to its destination. Keeping
this and other functional requirements in mind,
the necessary constituents of the RV will be as
follows:
♦ MMR radar for target identification and
homing
♦ High Explosive for target damage/
(HE) destruction
♦ Battery for providing power to the
on-board systems
♦ OBC On board command and
sequencing of events
♦ NGC Navigation and guidance
unit
♦ Control RCS unit to provide
thrusters steering in pitch, yaw and
roll
♦ Retro motor For arresting the reentry
velocity
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♦ Aerodynamic For steering purposes
Flaps
♦ Thermal For providing thermal
Protection protection to the RV
constituents
One has to examine if all the above elements,
except the thermal protection system (TPS), can
be housed within the RV volume. The TPS
obviously comes over the RV structure.
3. RV Layout
The primary requirement is reduce the velocity
and this can be achieved using solid propellant
retro motors mounted appropriately.
Additionally a set of 8 RCS thrusters is envisaged
to provide turning moments in the pitch up,
pitch down, yaw left and yaw right directions.
Roll control is automatically obtained by firing
the opposite set of thrusters to produce a
couple.
For this exercise, it is assumed that the maximum
deceleration would be of the order of 8 g's.
This seems to be a reasonable number as the
reentry modules of manned space craft are
aerodynamically designed to limit the
deceleration to 8-10 g's. The forward force was
computed and arbitrarily it was assumed that
70% of this force should be applied for retro
braking maneuver.
Chandrashekar and Ramani, from the trajectory
computation have figured a requirement of 200
kg of bipropellant for in-plane and out-of plane
maneuvers of the RV to home in on the target.
This propellant mass was equally divided
among the 8 thrusters-4 each in the pitch plane
and yaw plane. Bipropellant thrusters using
Table 7: RV Mass Breakup
Subsystem Dimensions (in m) Mass, kg
Airframe Structure Cylindrical section 1.4 Φ x 0.7
Cone Frustum section 1.4 Φ x 0.7Φ x 1.2 200
Nose cap 0.7 Φ x 0.5
NTO Tank 600 Φ 6
NTO 150
MMH Tank 500 Φ 6
MMH 60
He Gas Tank 400 Φ 10
He Gas 2
Thrusters 0.3 Φ x 0.4 (each) 40
Plumbing, mounting brackets 20
Retro motors 150Φ x 575 (each) 100
High Explosives 1.0 Φ x 0.7Φ x 0.8 500
SAR 0.7 Φ x0.5 200
Avionics Distributed 250
Power 50
Mechanical flaps and actuators 100
Grand Total 1694
(say ,1700 kg)
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nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as oxidizer and Mono
methyl hydrazine (MMH) as fuel could deliver
a thrust of 7500 N per thruster. It must be
noted that if the thruster is used in the pulse
mode, the thrust will be lower and of the order
of 7000 N. The pulse could be 200 to 500 milli-
second duration.
Additionally, mechanical flaps could be attached
to the base of the RV. The flaps could be stowed
inwards during launch and deployed after the
vehicle velocity is reduced. The actuation of the
flaps will produce steering moments in the pitch,
yaw and roll directions. It is conceivable that
flap actuation can be usefully employed at
altitudes in the vicinity of 20 km.
For managing the high values of stagnation point
heat transfer (the temperature at the nose tip
may exceed 1600 K), the metallic structure of
the RV has to be protected using ablative liners
made of carbon fibre reinforced plastics. The nose
portion is generally made of carbon-carbon
material which has superior mechanical and
erosion resistant properties.
The dimensions of the retro motors, the RCS
thrusters, tankage, high explosives have been
worked out and the MMR radar dimensions and
mass have been taken from manufacture's data. The
total RV mass works out 1694 kg and is rounded
off to 1700 kg. The details are show in Table 7.
A possible layout is also provided in figure 15.
The RCS thrusters are located near the base of
the RV to provide a long moment arm. The retro
motors are provided near the top just above the
location, where the high explosive pile is located.




It is also possible to reduce the reentry velocity
by affecting re-entry at a high angle of attack. The
body offers a higher drag in this process, which
helps in reduction of the deceleration and velocity.
If required, a pull up maneuver can be performed
followed subsequently by a ballistic path. In this
process, time of flight can be increased, range can
be increased and deceleration levels can be
brought down to manageable levels. While such
maneuvers are normally designed for MaRV's to
avoid interception by defence systems, they can
also be effectively used for guiding the MaRV to
its target. Figure 16 shows the variation of
CL/CD variation with angle of attack as a function
of the vehicle bluntness ratio (ratio of the nose
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Figure 16: CL/CD vs bluntness ratio 1000. The flight sequence adapted here is as
follows:
1. Entry Altitude 250000 ft (76 km)
2. Velocity 22500 fps (6.86 km/s)
3. Flight Path Angle 12
4. Application of L/D At altitude of 150000
ft (45.7 km) constant
L/D of 0.5 applied and
maintained till altitude
of 70000 ft (21.3 km)
5. Pull up maneuver At 70000 ft (21.3 km)
to reach back altitude
of 140000 ft (42.7 km)
6. Final path Ballistic like trajectory
till impact
Figure 17: Comparison of ballistic and lifting body trajectories
Figure 18: Comparison of ballistic and lifting body trajectories
Figures 17 to 19 show an example of MaRV
trajectory for a RV with ballistic coefficient of
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Figure 19: Comparison of ballistic and lifting body trajectories
The advantages derived from the lifting, pull-up
and ballistic path over a pure ballistic trajectory
are:
a) Increase in range by a factor of 2.5
b) Entry time increased to 325 sec over 85 sec
for ballistic
c) Significant reduction in deceleration,
stagnation point heat transfer and dynamic
pressure.
The maneuverability to the reentry vehicle in
pitch, yaw and roll directions can be provided
by moving flaps. Such surfaces will be very
effective once the velocity of the vehicle has been
reduced. Bipropellant RCS systems can provide
for attitude correction for maintaining the reentry
L/D as well as for the pull-up maneuver.
The RV requirements are rendered much simpler
with the above scheme of things. The retro
motors can be dispensed with. The RCS functions
also become simpler with one maneuver
requirement of increasing the reentry angle of
attack-all other maneuvers will be executed
through the movable flaps. The revised layout
of the RV shown in figure 20 highlights this
aspect.
Figure 20: Revised RV Layout
SAR
Avionics
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The elimination of the RV leaves more space for
laying out the high explosives, the RCS and the
avionics systems. The mass and space earlier utilized
for housing the retro-motors can be used for storing
decoys. The pull-up maneuver is a desirable feature
if one wants to increase the flight time and can be
executed through the use of flaps. The RCS thrusters
will be used only for 3-axes stabilization and not
fur executing maneuvers. It is possible by judicious
choice of materials and layout, the mass of the RV
could be reduced by 200-300 kg and the resulting
saving could help in either increasing the payload
or increasing range of the missile.
5. Conclusion
The DF-21 Maneuverable warhead details are
studied based on the dimensions derived from
open source imagery. It seems that the warhead
can be designed to be slowed either
aerodynamically or through the use of retro
motors. Further mission objectives can be met
either by planning maneuverable descent or by
using reaction control motors. Possible layout
and mass breakup is worked out.
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Qiu Zhenwei and a coauthor state that by 2010
the Second Artillery Corps will control one ASBM
brigade, armed withDF-21E ASBMs.
In Qiu’s scenario, the PLA tracks three
approaching U.S. CSGs with synthetic-aperture-
radar / optical reconnaissance satellites, 2,500–
3,500-kilometer sky-wave OTH radar, and “land
listening stations.” U.S. attempts at interference
only improve targeting. PLA forces obtain the
carrier’s position from “radio signals transmitted
when communicating via [Link16]” and confirm
it from “signals emitted by the air search radar,
air control radar, and aircraft approach guidance
radar.”
DF-21E ASBMs are launched in two wave attacks
with “a special incendiary agent and additive, as
well as the dispersal of gas in the sky above” to
reduce the initial infrared signature.
A “third-stage rocket engine” gives the ASBMs a
depressed trajectory, “with multiple peaks” and
“increasingly violent maneuvers,” that is
“extended by 300 km and dropped by 10 km.”
To compensate for the fact that the homing
“antenna window” remains open, the warheads
are further concealed by a cooled shroud, balloon
decoys, and symmetrical spinning, thereby
defeating SM-3 interceptors.
29 Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using The Land To Control The Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic
Missile”, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009, Vol. 62, No. 4, reference 66, pp. 84-85 provide a scenario of how the ASBM
will work. Erickson & Yang are skeptical about the knowledge of one of the authors to address this complex problem.
To eliminate inaccuracy of 15–42 km on a 1,100
km flight using aerodynamic flight forces to
extend range, “high-altitude homing” is
conducted through “radio command
amendments” from satellites (including ones
recently launched to support military
operations), “unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft,” multimode “microwave radiometers,”
and sky-wave/passive radar.
This is followed by “terminal infrared image
homing,” during which the warheads adopt an
“unpredictable swinging trajectory,” thereby
“easily evading air defense missiles.” Twelve and
a half minutes after launch, the first four DF-21E
ASBMs strike the targeted CSG destroyers, either
“sinking the ships or inflicting severe damage to
their ammunition warehouses and engine
rooms.” Three minutes later, a second salvo
strikes the three aircraft carriers.
The author maintains that “a conservative set
of ASBM data has been used for this scenario;
for example, the hypothetical [radar cross
section] of the warhead was 0.001 square
meters, the warheads did not electronically jam
the data link of the radar or intercept missile or
the GPS navigation of the intercept missile,
many missi les were not launched
simultaneously to create confusion, and anti
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ship missiles did not attack the destroyers that
had given up their air defense capabilities.”
While stating that “in the foreseeable future,
there wil l  be many ways to shoot down
anti  ship ball ist ic missi les that use
countermeasures,” due to advances in missile
tracking capabilities and interceptors, the author
cites many “weaknesses of the U.S. military’s
entire system” and concludes that “at the
very minimum, the aggressor will hold the
advantage prior to 2020.”
Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan, “930 Seconds,”
pp. 27–34.
